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Abstract 
 
Several neurological patient populations, including Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), appear to produce 
an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements 
that maximise the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the 
following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used 
extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, 
however, suggests that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral 
rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of 
the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., 2011). We sought 
the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content 
(utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counterintuitive) were measured concurrently. 
Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; 
disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counterintuitive, and 
deontological judgements only when they were counterintuitive. These results speak against the view 
that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted 
following TBI.  
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Research on the cognitive and neural bases of moral judgments has blossomed in the last 15 years 
and a clear finding appears to have emerged: utilitarian judgements (i.e., those that maximise 
aggregate welfare) are associated with increased activation in a core group of frontal brain areas 
implicated in deliberate controlled processing; deontological judgements (i.e., those judgements that 
conform to moral laws) are associated with those brain areas associated with automatic processing 
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). Moral judgement has also been investigated in neurological 
populations with frontal lobe lesions (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) and Traumatic 
Brain Injury (TBI; Martins et al., 2012); populations who characteristically show emotional blunting, 
impaired empathy and social cognition, egocentrism (Mitchell et al., 2006; Müller et al., 2003) and 
demonstrate socially inappropriate behaviour (Beer et al., 2006; Cicerone & Tanenbaum, 1997; 
Pitman et al., 2014). This profile is observed routinely in TBI, where neuropathology is caused by an 
impact to, or rapid acceleration/deceleration of, the brain (Lezak et al., 2012). Neural damage is 
characteristically diffuse in TBI, but the frontal cortex is especially vulnerable to lesion (Lezak et al., 
2012).  In addition, subcortical and white matter tract damage caused by traumatic axonal injury 
compromises the integrity of neural networks, causing disruption of functions reliant on the integrity 
of these networks (Hayes et al., 2016; Lipton et al., 2009). In this study we investigate the moral 
judgements made by TBI patients to further our understanding of the cognitive and neural bases of 
moral judgement. 
In a two-system cognitive account of moral judgement, Greene et al. (2004) characterize ‘system 
1’ as the rapid and automatic processes delivering moral judgement, while higher order processes of 
deliberative reasoning are engaged by ‘system 2’. The automatic system biases toward ‘deontological’ 
moral judgements – judgements that conform to moral laws such as do not lie; do not harm others 
(Kant, 1785/1959), whereas controlled processing allows us to override these judgements in favour of 
more reasoned ‘utilitarian’ judgements – ones that maximise aggregate welfare (Greene et al., 2008). 
Greene et al (2004) provide data to support this assertion. In dilemmas where utilitarian judgements 
required the maiming or killing of another person (e.g., the infamous “trolley dilemma”, where 
participants are asked whether they should pull a lever to divert the course of a train condemning one 
bystander to death but saving five others) participants took longer to endorse utilitarian actions than 
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deontological ones. Additionally, neural activity in dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortices, (areas associated with controlled processing) correlated with utilitarian moral judgement. 
This was taken as evidence for the involvement of effortful cognition in utilitarian judgements, both in 
these extreme scenarios and more broadly (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008).  
However data from patient studies would appear to pose a problem for Greene’s model. 
Populations with TBI (Martins et al., 2012), circumscribed ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
lesions (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), fronto-temporal dementia (Mendez et al., 2005) 
and psychopathy (Koenigs et al., 2012) all show a utilitarian bias compared to healthy controls in 
moral dilemmas, which appears at odds with the view that these judgements require careful and 
controlled moral processing. One explanation for this is that patients have impairments in social 
cognition (e.g., empathy, perspective taking, Theory of Mind) and consequently have a reduced 
aversion to harming others (i.e., a reduced aversion to killing the lone protagonist in the service of 
saving many others – see the example above). Support for this idea is seen in skin conductance 
response (SCR) studies: a strong skin conductance response (SCR) precedes utilitarian judgements in 
healthy controls, but no such response is seen when patients with VMPFC lesions make identical 
judgements (Moretto et al., 2010). Further, in healthy participants, reduced aversion to harming others 
(Cushman et al., 2012), lower trait empathy (Choe & Min, 2011), and higher psychoticism 
(characterised by reduced empathy and emotional blunting; Weich et al., 2013) all correlate with 
increased levels of utilitarian judgement.  
Taken together then, the evidence suggests a link between social cognition and utilitarian 
judgements in both clinical and non-clinical populations, and that this link may arise because the 
extent of our aversion to harming others may influence how appealing utilitarian solutions to moral 
dilemmas are. In the present study we therefore included measures of social cognition alongside moral 
dilemmas. 
Another problem for the two systems theory is that only extreme moral dilemmas have been 
employed to test it, where utilitarian judgements required the violation of highly regarded 
deontological rules, such as do not kill. As such, the observed association between controlled 
processing and utilitarian judgement could be due to an artefact of the limited range of dilemmas 
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employed. One possibility is that in extreme dilemmas, deontological judgements are more 
psychologically intuitive, whereas utilitarian judgements are psychologically counterintuitive. This 
possibility has prima facie appeal; judgements which endorse murder in the service of aggregate 
welfare might not be immediately appealing, whereas judgements which only require a lie or a broken 
promise may be immediately compelling, or intuitive. 
For this reason then, Kahane and colleagues (2011) devised new dilemmas which captured the 
tension between maximising aggregate welfare and adherence to moral rules, while controlling for 
psychological intuitiveness. They collected normative data for these dilemmas; recording the non-
reflective judgements of a group of independent judges and assigning dilemmas to one of two 
categories. A dilemma was categorised as Intuitively Utilitarian (UI) when most judges intuitively 
violated the moral rule in order to maximise aggregate welfare. For example:  
“You know a man called Fred. Fred is a prejudiced and grumpy person who often 
takes a disliking to people for no good reason. You also have a friend who admires 
Fred and gives great weight to his opinions. However, Fred despises your friend. 
One day, your friend asks you what Fred thinks of him. Your friend would be 
devastated to discover that Fred despises him, but will only find out if you tell him. 
Should you tell your friend that Fred despises him?” [Adapted from the original] 
In this case, normative data indicated that people disregarded the deontological rule “do not lie” 
in favour of the course of action which maximised welfare (preserving your friend’s self-esteem) and 
so it was categorised as a UI dilemma. Thus, a utilitarian judgement in these dilemmas is also an 
“intuitive” judgement, whilst a deontological judgement is a “counterintuitive” judgement.  
Conversely, dilemmas were categorised as Intuitively Deontological (DI) when most judges upheld 
the deontological rule. This category involved deontological rules which were considered more 
absolute, such as the impermissibility of killing. For example:  
“You are a Doctor. You have five very poorly patients who are all about to die of 
various failing organs. You have another patient who is healthy. The only way you 
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can save the lives of the first five patients is to remove this man’s organs, and 
transplant them into the five poorly patients. The healthy man does not want you to 
take away his organs. If you do this, the health man will die, and the five will live. 
Should you perform these transplants?” [Adapted from the original] 
The normative sample overwhelmingly rejected utilitarianism here, choosing to uphold the 
deontological rule despite the net harm (five deaths rather than one). As such, this was categorised as 
a DI dilemma. In this category then, a utilitarian judgement is a “counterintuitive” judgement, and a 
deontological judgement is an “intuitive” judgement (the exact inverse of the UI dilemmas, thus 
allowing preferences for utilitarian and deontological judgements to be measured independently of 
their intuitiveness).   
In an fMRI study using these new stimuli (Kahane et al., 2011), the previously reported neural and 
behavioural association between controlled processing and utilitarian judgements disappeared. 
Healthy participants rated counterintuitive judgements as more difficult than intuitive judgements, but 
did not rate utilitarian judgements as more difficult than deontological ones. Furthermore, the pattern 
of neural activation was related to the intuitiveness of judgements.  
During counterintuitive judgements, activation was recorded in the rostral and dorsal cingulate 
cortex, primary and secondary somatosensory cortex, insula, ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex, and 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex, irrespective of the (deontological/utilitarian) content of the judgement. 
Kahane and colleagues (2011) concluded that previous findings associating utilitarian judgements 
with controlled processing were an artefact of the limited dilemmas employed, and that healthy people 
use controlled processing when making any counterintuitive moral judgement, regardless of its 
content (though see Paxton et al, 2014). They note, however, that it remains unclear precisely which 
controlled processes are involved in moral judgements (e.g., inhibitory control, attentional flexibility 
or working memory).   
During intuitive judgements, activation was recorded in the visual, premotor, and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortices, and the temporal lobe; areas which have been associated with various aspects of 
social cognition: empathy (Nummenmaa et al., 2008), affective Theory of Mind (ToM; Shamay-
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Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany & Aharon-Peretz, 2006) and emotional perspective taking (Lamm et al., 2007). 
Indeed, a trait tendency towards empathy increases preference for deontological judgements in 
extreme dilemmas (Crockett, Clark, Hauser & Robbins, 2010; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). ToM in 
particular is understood to rely on a distributed cortical and subcortical network comprising (at least) 
the medial prefrontal cortex, left and right temporo-parietal junctions, the temporal poles, and the 
amygdala circuitry (Apperly, 2011; Siegal & Varley, 2002). It is noteworthy that the VMPFC, a 
necessary area for affective ToM (Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany & Aharon-Peretz, 2006), was 
implicated in intuitive moral judgement in Kahane and colleagues’ fMRI study.  
In sum then, the evidence suggests that the intuitiveness of a moral judgement, rather than its 
content, is the key factor in controlled versus automatic processing, and thus there is reason to doubt 
reports of utilitarian bias in focal frontal injury, TBI, and other clinical populations including autism, 
fronto-temporal dementia and psychopathy (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; 
Koenigs et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2012; Mendez et al., 2005), as all of these studies employed a 
limited range of extreme dilemmas which did not control for intuitiveness. It also appears that social 
cognition, including empathy and ToM likely play a role in moral judgement. Moreover, a wealth of 
evidence demonstrates that ToM is compromised following TBI (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Martín-
Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010; Muller et al., 2010), as are other abilities implicated in moral 
judgement, such as empathy and emotional expressiveness and regulation (Beer et al., 2006; Cicerone 
& Tanenbaum, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2006; Müller et al., 2003; Pitman et al., 2014; Stuss, 2011).  
The present study 
To date, no study has investigated the effect of brain pathology on both content and intuitiveness 
in moral judgement, and therefore their relative importance in explaining atypical moral judgement 
patterns is unknown. In order to address this issue, the present study employed a cross-sectional case-
control design in which participants with TBI and healthy controls gave their moral judgements on 
dilemmas devised by Kahane and colleagues (2011). Participants also completed a range of social 
cognition measures and cognitive assessments. 
If TBI causes a specific bias towards utilitarianism, then these participants should make more 
utilitarian judgements compared to controls, regardless of intuitiveness. Such a finding would suggest 
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that the content (utilitarian/deontological) of moral judgement is relevant to the processes of 
automatic and controlled moral judgement, and would support, and extend previous findings to less 
extreme dilemmas involving lying and breaking promises. 
However, if intuitiveness is the crucial factor, TBI participants should make more utilitarian 
judgements than controls only in DI dilemmas, where utilitarianism is counterintuitive. This would 
indicate that the neural networks impacted by TBI are not sensitive to the content of a judgement per 
se, but instead its intuitiveness.  
In dilemmas where the utilitarian option is intuitive, it remains unclear whether TBI participants 
would show a preference for counterintuitive judgements. One possibility is that TBI causes a 
preference for counterintuitive judgements only in extreme (DI) dilemmas where serious physical 
harm is at stake. Alternatively, TBI may result in a general tendency to make counterintuitive 
judgements, irrespective of dilemma type.  
Finally, if reduced aversion to harm underlies counterintuitive judgement following TBI, then the 
TBI group should be able to make these judgements with relative ease. As such, we expect TBI 
participants to find counterintuitive responses easier to make compared to controls, within both UI 
and DI dilemmas. In addition, if disruption of social cognition modulates moral judgement 
disturbance following TBI, then ToM processes (particularly its emotional components) should be 
associated with counterintuitive moral judgement.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty adults (5 female; mean age = 41.3 (SD = 13.67)) with non-penetrating TBI were recruited 
via NHS community neuropsychology services, Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust inpatient and 
community services and the Headway charity across England. Inclusion criteria were: (1) history of 
TBI, (2) at least 12 months post-injury, (3) fluent in English. Exclusion criteria were: (1) significant 
visual, perceptual or language impairment, (2) TBI incurred before 18 years, (3) other neurological 
disorder, (4) current major depressive disorder, PTSD or psychosis, (5) developmental disorder. Self-
report was the primary method used to determine eligibility, although the medical records of those 
recruited from clinical services were screened for eligibility in the first instance by treating clinicians.  
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   8 
 
TBI severity was categorised according to available information on post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) 
duration, length of unconsciousness (LOC) and lowest Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Jones, 1979) 
score, in that order of preference. Table 1 displays cut-offs for injury severity categorisation and the 
number of TBI participants in each category.  
Thirty healthy controls (11 female; mean age = 39.8 (SD = 14.56)) were recruited to match the 
demographic of TBI participants. Exclusion criteria were: (1) neurological disorder, (2) current major 
depressive disorder, PTSD or psychosis, (3) developmental disorder. All participants gave informed 
consent and the study was approved by an NHS research ethics committee, in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki (1991). 
The TBI and control groups were comparable in terms of gender [X² (2, 60) = 3.068, p = .080] and 
level of education [U = 404.5, z = -0.706, p = .480]. The groups did not differ significantly in age or 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) scores, but differed 
significantly in verbal (VIQ), performance (PIQ) and full scale (FSIQ) intellectual ability as measured 
by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) (see Table 2).  
Materials and procedure  
All participants were tested on a range of moral dilemmas followed by testing on a number of 
social cognition, IQ and depression and anxiety measures. 
Moral Dilemmas: Ten of the eighteen dilemmas from Kahane et al (2011) were adapted for the 
study. These were selected to encompass the range of deontological rules involved in the originals, 
comprising five UI and five DI dilemmas. The dilemmas were rearranged into storyboards and 
cartoon drawings were created to aid comprehension (see supplementary data). In a piloting exercise, 
two groups (total n = 18) of independent judges gave their non-reflective responses to the original or 
the adapted dilemmas. On average, judges placed each dilemma in its originally assigned category 
77% of the time (range = 67% - 100%) (see supplementary data), and as such all ten of the adapted 
dilemmas retained their original categorisation based on previously employed cut-off of 67% 
agreement (Kahane et al., 2011).   
Dilemmas were presented to participants first, in a fixed randomized order on laminated paper. 
The experimenter read the dilemmas aloud once, before inviting participants to make a judgement on 
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what they should do. Participants were then asked to rate the difficulty of each judgement on a 1 (not 
difficult at all) to 10 (very difficult) scale. Answers to each dilemma were recorded and subsequently 
categorised (intuitive/counterintuitive; utilitarian/deontological).   
Social Cognition measures: In a perspective taking task (Tversky & Hard, 2009) participants were 
shown a photograph and asked to give the spatial location of an object, where the answer differed 
depending on whether participants took their own or another’s visual perspective. This was taken as a 
measure of spontaneous perspective taking (an automatic process relevant to ToM). Participants were 
then administered the WASI (Wechsler, 1999). Following a break, participants undertook the Faux 
Pas (FP) test (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998), which measures the ability to identify a social 
faux pas, and represent both the beliefs, intentions (cognitive ToM) and feelings (affective ToM) of 
characters involved. Then came the revised version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME: 
Baron‐Cohen et al., 2001) which measured affective ToM by asking participants to ascribe an 
emotional experience to actors in 36 images of eyes, choosing one of four adjectives. Finally, 
participants completed the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  
Data Analysis 
Within Group Analyses 
Moral judgement data was transformed into proportions for each participant. Proportions of 
intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgement were analysed separately for UI and DI dilemmas 
using one-sample t-tests, reporting 95% CI’s. Preference for utilitarian versus deontological 
judgements were analysed similarly, pooled across all dilemmas. Mean proportions were tested 
against a value of 0.5; the value expected if participants showed no preference for either option during 
moral judgement. Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare difficulty ratings between intuitive and 
counterintuitive judgements in both UI and DI dilemmas, and between utilitarian and deontological 
judgements in all dilemmas.   
Between Group Analyses 
One way mixed ANOVA analysed differences between groups and dilemma type (UI/DI) in 
proportion of counterintuitive judgements. Dilemmas were then pooled across dilemma type and 
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group differences in counterintuitive judgement were investigated using independent samples t-tests 
with 95% CI’s. Group differences in utilitarian judgement were analysed similarly. As this data was 
proportional, the sum of intuitive and counterintuitive judgements (and utilitarian and deontological 
judgements) for each participant was 1.0. 
The difficulty cost of selecting the counterintuitive response over the intuitive response, and the 
utilitarian response over the deontological response, was calculated by subtracting the latter from the 
former for each case. These were computed because both utilitarian judgements and counterintuitive 
judgements should theoretically be more difficult than their opposites, according to the positions of 
Greene and colleagues (2008) and Kahane and colleagues (2011). A one way mixed ANOVA was 
used to analyse the differences between groups and dilemma type in the difficulty cost of 
counterintuitive judgements. Again, all dilemmas were then pooled and group differences investigated 
using independent samples t-tests. 
Social Cognition Analyses 
Independent samples t-tests were employed to test for group differences on ToM and IQ variables 
and Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated for the whole sample between moral judgement 
and cognitive variables. BCa 95% CI’s are reported.  
For the TBI group, ToM variables were entered into a hierarchical multiple regression model, with 
proportion of counterintuitive responses as the dependent variable. Bootstrapped-p-values were 
computed. Affective ToM variables (Faux Pas empathy and RME) were entered at step one, and the 
cognitive ToM variable (Faux Pas cognitive index) at step two. Bootstrapping was used in these 
analyses due to non-normal distribution in the Faux Pas data.  
Results 
Within Group Analyses 
Control group moral judgements 
The proportion of intuitive judgements was significantly higher than the 0.5 baseline in both UI 
[t(29) =8.361, p <.001, 95% CI (.227,.373)] and DI [t(29) = 4.110, p <.001, 95% CI (.101,.300)] 
dilemmas (see Figure 1A). The control group showed no significant preference for utilitarian (or 
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deontological) judgements when all dilemmas were pooled together and compared against the 0.5 
baseline [t(29) = 1.455, p = .156, 95% CI (-.019,.112)].  
Control group difficulty ratings 
Controls rated counterintuitive judgements as significantly more difficult than intuitive judgements 
in both UI [t(19) = -3.931, p =.001, 95% CI (-3.24,-.988)] and DI [t(20) = -3.839, p =.001, 95% CI (-
3.987,-1.179)] dilemmas (see Figure 1 B). However difficulty ratings did not differ significantly 
between utilitarian and deontological judgements overall [t(29) = 0.300, p = .766, 95% CI 
(.543,.730)]. 
TBI group moral judgements 
The proportion of intuitive judgements was significantly higher than the 0.5 baseline in UI [t(29) = 
3.137, p =.004, 95% CI (.044,.209)], but not DI [t(29) = 0.377, p = .709, 95% CI (-.089,.129)] 
dilemmas (see Figure 1C). The TBI group showed no significant preference for utilitarian (or 
deontological) judgements when all dilemmas were pooled and compared against the 0.5 baseline 
[t(29) =  1.306, p = .202, 95% CI (-.028,.128)]. 
TBI group difficulty ratings 
In the TBI group there was no significant difference in the difficulty ratings of intuitive versus 
counterintuitive judgements in UI [t(26) = 0.232, p = .818, 95% CI (-.703,.882)] or DI [t(26) = 0.419, 
p = .679, 95% CI (-.669,1.010)] dilemmas (see Figure 1D). Additionally, difficulty ratings did not 
differ significantly between utilitarian and deontological judgements overall [t(29) = -0.180, p = .858, 
95% CI (-.644,.539)].  
Between Group Analyses 
Moral judgements 
There was a main effect of group on the proportions of counterintuitive judgements [F(1, 58) = 
19.484, p <.001], with more counterintuitive judgements in the TBI group, and a main effect of 
dilemma type [F(1, 58) = 4.362, p = .041], with more counterintuitive judgements in DI dilemmas. 
There was no significant group x dilemma type interaction [F(1, 58) = 0.005, p = .947]. 
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Group comparisons pooled across both dilemma types (see Figure 2A) indicated that overall the 
TBI group made a significantly higher proportion of counterintuitive judgements than controls [t(58) 
= 4.331, p <.001, 95% CI (.093,.253)], but the two groups did not differ significantly in their 
preference for utilitarian judgements [t(58) = 0.067, p = .947, 95% CI (-.097,.103)]. 
Difficulty cost data 
There was a main effect of group on the difficulty cost of counterintuitive judgements, with the 
control group exhibiting higher difficulty costs [F(1, 33) = 27.065, p <.001]. There was no significant 
effect of dilemma type [F(1, 33) = 0.364, p = .550] and no significant group x dilemma type 
interaction [F(1, 33) = 0.154, p = .697]. 
Group comparisons pooled across dilemma type revealed that the control and TBI groups differed 
significantly in the difficulty cost exhibited when they selected the counterintuitive response [t(55) = -
5.132, p <.001, 95% CI (-2.938,-1.288)], with the control group exhibiting a higher mean difficulty 
cost than the TBI group (see Figure 2B). TBI and control groups did not differ significantly in the 
difficulty cost associated with utilitarian judgements [t(58) = -0.342, p = .733, 95% CI (-.996,.705)].  
Social cognition 
The TBI group attained significantly lower scores than controls on cognitive [t(33.61) = -3.465, p 
= .004, BCa 95% CI (-.112,-.031)] and affective [t(30.31) = -3.360, p = .012, BCa 95% CI (-.193,-
.051)] Faux Pas indices, and the RME [t(58) = -2.097, p = .035, BCa 95% CI (-.136,-.011)]. There 
were no significant group differences in the tendency toward spontaneous perspective taking [X² (2, 
60) = 0.084, p = .959]. As such no further analyses of this measure were conducted.  
Moral judgement and Social Cognition 
Whole sample 
Neither the proportion of utilitarian judgements nor the difficulty cost associated with utilitarian 
decisions significantly correlated with any ToM or IQ variables. However all IQ and ToM variables 
showed significant, generally moderate, correlations with the proportion of counterintuitive 
judgements (see Table 3).   
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TBI group 
The first model in the regression equation, containing affective ToM variables, significantly 
predicted 20.6% of the variance [F(2, 27) = 3.492, p = .045]. In this model, only the RME contributed 
uniquely to prediction of counterintuitive judgements (β = -.520, p = .022). The second model, 
containing both cognitive and affective ToM variables, accounted for only 3.6% of additional 
variance in counterintuitive judgements (R2 change = .036) and did not attain statistical significance 
[F(3, 26) = 2.755, p = .063].  
Discussion 
Previous research has demonstrated that several neurological patient populations, including 
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), produce utilitarian judgements to moral dilemmas (Ciaramelli et al., 
2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Martins et al., 2012; Mendez et al., 2005) although how best to interpret 
the data was unclear. The present study adapted moral dilemmas from previous research (Kahane et 
al., 2011), which allowed the intuitiveness of moral judgement to be controlled for, and applied these 
new dilemmas to participants with TBI for the first time.  
Characterising Moral Judgement in TBI 
Overall, our TBI participants made similar proportions of utilitarian judgements to controls - but 
they made substantially more counterintuitive judgements. On closer analysis, our TBI group did in 
fact show an atypical preference for utilitarian judgements under limited circumstances; 
disproportionately selecting utilitarian judgements in extreme moral dilemmas where the utilitarian 
option was counterintuitive (i.e. DI dilemmas similar to those used in previous research). However in 
more everyday dilemmas where utilitarianism was intuitive (i.e. UI dilemmas), our TBI participants 
were less likely than controls to endorse the utilitarian option, again favouring the counterintuitive 
(and incidentally, deontological) response. On this evidence then, TBI causes a generalised bias 
toward the counterintuitive option, not a specific bias towards utilitarianism.  
These findings support the hypothesis that the distributed neural systems damaged by TBI are not 
sensitive to the deontological or utilitarian content of a judgement, but rather to how psychologically 
intuitive these judgements are.  They speak directly against the assertion that TBI gives rise to 
atypically utilitarian judgements (Martins et al., 2012), and cast doubt more broadly on the 
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generalisability of similar conclusions in other neurological populations (e.g. Ciaramelli et al., 2007; 
Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez et al., 2005). Such studies may have been biased by the limited range of 
dilemmas they employed; our TBI participants made more counterintuitive judgements regardless of 
utilitarian or deontological content. Previous research has focussed exclusively on extreme dilemmas 
where a utilitarian response was counterintuitive – as a consequence counterintuitive judgements were 
able to masquerade as a tendency towards utilitarian judgements.   
The generalised pattern of counterintuitive judgements reported here deviates somewhat from 
recent evidence that higher levels of psychoticism correlates selectively with increased levels of 
counterintuitive utilitarian judgements, but not counterintuitive deontological judgements (Weich et 
al., 2013). However, in the present study, 87% of the TBI group had suffered a severe or very severe 
TBI. Injuries of this type are known to cause extensive cortical and subcortical pathophysiology 
resulting in chronic and severe disturbances in executive functions, social cognition, judgement and 
decision making, and a host of supportive cognitive functions (Cicerone & Tanenbaum, 1997; Lezak 
et al,. 2012; Newcombe et al., 2011; Mathias & Wheaton, 2007; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000). Given this 
level of impairment, it is perhaps unsurprising that judgement disturbances were apparent across 
extreme and more everyday moral dilemmas.  
Moral Judgement and Social Cognition in TBI  
Neither the TBI or control group demonstrated a significant difficulty cost when selecting the 
utilitarian response over the deontological response, supporting previous findings that utilitarian 
judgements are not more difficult than deontological judgements (Kahane et al., 2011). Our controls 
exhibited a substantial difficulty cost when making counterintuitive judgements over intuitive 
judgements, but the TBI group showed a complete absence of this effect, indicating that they arrived 
at these counterintuitive judgements with ease relative to controls. This data supports the hypothesis 
that a strongly reduced aversion to harm underlies counterintuitive judgements following TBI. 
This is consistent with neuroimaging and behavioural evidence which implicates social-cognitive 
processes in moral judgement (Greene et al., 2001; Avramova & Inbar, 2013). It is striking that our 
TBI group were able to make counterintuitive judgements in the complete absence of a difficulty cost, 
and this is consistent with evidence that VMPFC patients show a total absence of SCR when making 
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counterintuitive utilitarian judgements involving highly aversive emotional content (Moretto et al., 
2010). This absence of a difficulty cost was evident across both DI and UI dilemmas, indicating that 
aversion to harm is relevant across the spectrum of moral dilemmas. Indeed, although harms were 
more extreme in DI dilemmas, UI dilemmas still involved significant harms, where negative outcomes 
included serious social consequences such as the breakdown of a friend’s marriage. Nonetheless, the 
use of objective physiological measures of affect would be beneficial in evaluating this view in future 
research.  
In our whole sample, affective and cognitive ToM correlated moderately with the proportion of 
counterintuitive judgements, although general intelligence was the strongest correlate. Affective ToM, 
as measured by the RME, captured significant variance in counterintuitive judgements after TBI, but 
the Faux Pas test failed to add significant predictive value to the regression model. As such, our 
regression model indicates that better performance on the affective ToM task predicts more intuitive 
moral judgements (and thus, fewer counter-intuitive judgements) following TBI. Such a particular 
role for affective ToM is consistent with the literature suggesting that intuitive judgements (including 
deontological judgements in extreme dilemmas) are computed by a reflexive ‘system 1’ involving 
visual, premotor, and VMPFC activity at the neural level, which is thought to correspond to emotion 
processing, empathy and affective ToM at the cognitive level (Kahane et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2007; 
Nummenmaa et al., 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany & Aharon-Peretz, 2006).  
Indeed, affective and cognitive ToM are supported by partially dissociable prefrontal networks 
(Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007), with affective ToM relying specifically on the VMPFC, 
and cognitive ToM recruiting the prefrontal cortex more broadly. On a somewhat speculative note, 
this suggests that cognitive ToM may be a more computationally complex process, and as such more 
likely a higher order, conscious and deliberative “system 2” process. As such, its lack of contribution 
to the prediction of intuitive moral judgements in our study is not surprising. Irrespective of this issue, 
our findings provide general support for the involvement of socio-cognitive processes and harm 
aversion in counterintuitive moral judgement following TBI.  
Finally, the combined observations that TBI results in a bias toward counterintuitive moral 
judgement, and that these judgements tend to be arrived at with relatively little effort, may go some 
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way to explaining the clinical and familial observations that TBI survivors are often impulsive in their 
decision making and make judgements that are hard for others to understand (Bechara & Van Der 
Linden, 2005). Indeed, when TBI participants responded in a counterintuitive way, our data indicates 
that they did so as though the judgement had come to them intuitively. This is likely to be 
disconcerting to others and could certainly contribute to post-injury social and communication 
difficulties.  
Conclusion 
Our study presents behavioural evidence that intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgements are 
perturbed in TBI, but utilitarian judgements are not. This evidence is in accordance with recent 
neuroimaging data (Kahane et al., 2011) and indicates that the neural systems involved in moral 
judgement are sensitive to the properties of psychologically generated intuitions, but not to the 
tensions between competing normative philosophical doctrines. Our difficulty rating and social 
cognition data further suggests that atypical moral judgement in TBI is attributable, at least in part, to 
an impaired ability to mentalize about the emotional experiences of others, and ultimately an absence 
of emotional aversion to harming others. 
These disturbances in moral judgement held across a wide range of dilemmas, including extreme 
‘killing’ scenarios which are unlikely to ever occur to a person, as well as more ‘everyday’ dilemmas 
regarding marital infidelity, stealing and conflict resolution. It is likely that investigation of these 
everyday dilemmas will show the most promise in enhancing the clinical impact of this research, 
which has been identified as an objective for the area (Rosas & Koenigs, 2014).  
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Table 1. Classification of severity by Post-Traumatic Amnesia Duration (PTA), Length of loss of 
consciousness (LOC)  and Glasgow Coma Scale (GSC), and number of participants (n)in each 
group 
Severity 
classification 
PTA LOC GCS n 
Mild < 1 hour <15 minutes 13 - 15 1 
Moderate 1hour - 24 hours 15minutes - 6 hours 9 - 12 3 
Severe 24 hours - 7 days 6 hours - 48 hours 3 - 8 8 
Very severe > 7 days > 48 hours   18 
 
 
 
Table 2. Demographic , clinical and cognitive characteristics of TBI and control groups 
  
TBI Group (N = 30)        
M (SD) 
Control Group (N = 30) 
M (SD) t p 
Age 41.3 (13.67) 39.8 (14.56) 0.402 .689 
Years post-injury 9.3 (9.83) N/A   
HADS Depression 4.3 (3.67) 3.5 (4.35) 0.770 .445 
HADS Anxiety 6.0 (3.84) 6.2 (5.05) -0.144 .886 
HADS Total 10.2 (7.01) 9.7 (8.97) 0.273 .786 
VIQ 100.8 (19.17) 113.2 (12.47) -2.954 .005** 
PIQ 101.5 (17.21) 113.8 (21.11) -2.487 .016* 
FSIQ 101.3 (18.07) 117.5 (11.13) -4.190 .000*** 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 
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Figure 1. Judgement and difficulty rating data for TBI and controls individually. (A) Average proportion of 
utilitarian and deontological responses in the control group, in dilemmas where the utilitarian option is 
intuitive (UI) and where the deontological option is intuitive (DI). (B) Average difficulty ratings of utilitarian 
and deontological responses in the control group, in UI and DI dilemmas. (C) Average proportion of 
utilitarian and deontological responses in the TBI group, in UI and DI dilemmas. (D) Average difficulty 
ratings of utilitarian and deontological responses in the TBI group, in UI and DI dilemmas. Error bars are 
standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 2. Judgement and difficulty rating data in control and TBI groups. (A) Average proportions of 
utilitarian and counterintuitive judgements in TBI and controls, across all dilemmas. (B) Average 
difficulty cost of counterintuitive judgements (over intuitive judgements) and utilitarian judgements 
(over deontological judgements) separately for TBI and control groups. Error bars are standard error of 
the mean.  
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Table 3. Pearson product moment correlations between moral judgement variables and cognitive 
and social cognitive variables in the whole sample (n = 57) 
  
Proportion of 
utilitarian 
responses 
Cost of Utilitarian 
response 
Proportion of 
Counterintuitive 
responses 
Cost of 
Counterintuitive 
response 
WASI Verbal 
IQ 
r .104 .069 -.329* .269* 
p .441 .609 .013 .043 
BCa 95% CI -.134,.367 -.123,.281 -.533,-.042 .056,.451 
WASI 
Performance IQ 
r -.097 .099 -.359** .154 
p .474 .463 .006 .251 
BCa 95% CI  -.279,.119 -.109,.358  -.654,-.125 -.128,.483 
WASI Full 
Scale IQ 
r .057 .143 -.482*** .320* 
p .674 .29 .000 .015 
BCa 95% CI -.175,.300 -.048,.345 -.636,-.293 .101,.505 
Faux Pas 
Intentions 
Score 
r .086 .208 -.357** .198 
p .526 .121 .006 .139 
BCa 95% CI -.122,.259 -.077,.444 -.536,-.151 .013,.407 
Faux Pas Belief 
Score 
r .026 .214 -.379** .26 
p .845 .11 .004 .051 
BCa 95% CI -.250,.313 -.117,.486 -.579,-.135 .015,.474 
RME 
r -.056 .321* -.266* .303* 
p .676 .015 .046 .022 
BCa 95% CI -.319,.230 .096,.527 -.465,-.049 .119,.468 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. BCa bootstrap 95% CI’s reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   21 
 
References 
Apperly, I. (2010). Mindreaders: the cognitive basis of" theory of mind". Psychology Press: East Sussex.  
Avramova, Y. R., & Inbar, Y. (2013). Emotion and moral judgment. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Cognitive Science, 4(2), 169-178. 
Baron‐Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The “Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes” test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high‐
functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(2), 241-251. 
Bechara, A., & Van Der Linden, M. (2005). Decision-making and impulse control after frontal lobe 
injuries. Current Opinion in Neurology, 18(6), 734-739. 
Beer, J. S., John, O. P., Scabini, D., & Knight, R. T. (2006). Orbitofrontal cortex and social behavior: 
integrating self-monitoring and emotion-cognition interactions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
18(6), 871-879. 
Bibby, H., & McDonald, S. (2005). Theory of mind after traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychologia, 
43(1), 99-114. 
Choe, S. Y., & Min, K. H. (2011). Who makes utilitarian judgments? The influences of emotions on 
utilitarian judgments. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(7), 580-592. 
Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Ladavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. (2007). Selective deficit in personal moral 
judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 2(2), 84-92. 
Cicerone, K. D., & Tanenbaum, L. N. (1997). Disturbance of social cognition after traumatic 
orbitofrontal brain injury. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 12(2), 173-188. 
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010). Serotonin selectively influences 
moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 107(40), 17433-17438. 
Cushman, F., Gray, K., Gaffey, A., & Mendes, W. B. (2012). Simulating murder: the aversion to harmful 
action. Emotion, 12(1), 2. 
Declaration of Helinski (1991). British Medical Journal, 302, 1194. 
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   22 
 
Gleichgerrcht, E., Torralva, T., Rattazzi, A., Marenco, V., Roca, M., & Manes, F. (2013). Selective 
impairment of cognitive empathy for moral judgment in adults with high functioning autism. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(7), 780-788. 
Gleichgerrcht, E., & Young, L. (2013). Low levels of empathic concern predict utilitarian moral 
judgment. PloS one, 8(4), e60418. 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load 
selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144-1154. 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of 
cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389-400. 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI 
investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105-2108. 
Hayes, J. P., Bigler, E. D., & Verfaellie, M. (2016). Traumatic Brain Injury as a Disorder of Brain 
Connectivity. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 22(2), 120-137 
Jones, C. (1979). Glasgow coma scale. The American Journal of Nursing, 79(9), 1551-1557. 
Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2011). The neural basis of 
intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(4), 
393-402. 
Kant, I. (1959). Foundation of the metaphysics of morals (l W. Beck, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill. (Original work published 1785).  
Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., & Newman, J. P. (2012). Utilitarian moral judgment in 
psychopathy. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 708-714. 
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007). 
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. Nature, 446(7138), 908-911. 
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., & Decety, J. (2007). The neural substrate of human empathy: effects of 
perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(1), 42-58. 
Lezak, M. D., Howeison, D. B., Bigler, E. D., & Tranel, D. (2012). Neuropsychological Assessment (fifth 
Edition). Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. 
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   23 
 
Lipton, M. L., Gulko, E., Zimmerman, M. E., Friedman, B. W., Kim, M., Gellella, E., ... & Branch, C. A. 
(2009). Diffusion-Tensor Imaging Implicates Prefrontal Axonal Injury in Executive Function 
Impairment Following Very Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. Radiology, 252(3), 816-824. 
Martins, A. T., Faísca, L. M., Esteves, F., Muresan, A., & Reis, A. (2012). Atypical moral judgment 
following traumatic brain injury. Judgment and Decision Making, 7(4), 478-487. 
Martín-Rodríguez, J. F., & León-Carrión, J. (2010). Theory of mind deficits in patients with acquired 
brain injury: a quantitative review. Neuropsychologia, 48(5), 1181-1191. 
Mathias, J. L., & Wheaton, P. (2007). Changes in attention and information-processing speed following 
severe traumatic brain injury: a meta-analytic review. Neuropsychology, 21(2), 212. 
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005). An investigation of moral judgement in 
frontotemporal dementia. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18(4), 193-197. 
Mitchell, D. G., Avny, S. B., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). Divergent patterns of aggressive and 
neurocognitive characteristics in acquired versus developmental psychopathy. Neurocase, 12(3), 164-
178. 
Moretto, G., Làdavas, E., Mattioli, F., & Di Pellegrino, G. (2010). A psychophysiological investigation 
of moral judgment after ventromedial prefrontal damage. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(8), 
1888-1899. 
Müller, J. L., Schuierer, G., Marienhagen, J., Putzhammer, A., & Klein, H. E. (2003). “Acquired 
psychopathy" and the neurobiology of emotion and violence. Psychiatrische Praxis, 30, S221-5. 
Muller, F., Simion, A., Reviriego, E., Galera, C., Mazaux, J. M., Barat, M., & Joseph, P. A. (2010). 
Exploring theory of mind after severe traumatic brain injury. Cortex, 46(9), 1088-1099. 
Newcombe, V. F., Outtrim, J. G., Chatfield, D. A., Manktelow, A., Hutchinson, P. J., Coles, J. P., ... & 
Menon, D. K. (2011). Parcellating the neuroanatomical basis of impaired decision-making in 
traumatic brain injury. Brain, 134(3), 759-768. 
Nummenmaa, L., Hirvonen, J., Parkkola, R., & Hietanen, J. K. (2008). Is emotional contagion special? 
An fMRI study on neural systems for affective and cognitive empathy. Neuroimage, 43(3), 571-580. 
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   24 
 
Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Are “counter-intuitive” deontological judgments really 
counter-intuitive?: An empirical reply to Kahane et al.(2012). Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 9(9), 1368-1371. 
Pitman, I., Haddlesey, C., Ramos, S. D., Oddy, M., & Fortescue, D. (2014). The association between 
neuropsychological performance and self-reported traumatic brain injury in a sample of adult male 
prisoners in the UK. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 25(5), 763-779.  
Rao, V., & Lyketsos, C. (2000). Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of Traumatic Brain Injury. 
Psychosomatics, 41(2), 95-103. 
Rosas, A., & Koenigs, M. (2014). Beyond “utilitarianism”: Maximizing the clinical impact of moral 
judgment research. Social Neuroscience, 9(6), 661-667. 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and 
affective theory of mind: a lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 3054-3067. 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tibi-Elhanany, Y., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2006). The ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex is involved in understanding affective but not cognitive theory of mind stories. Social 
Neuroscience, 1(3-4), 149-166. 
Siegal, M., & Varley, R. (2002). Neural systems involved in 'theory of mind'. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 3(6), 463-471.Stone, V.E., Baron-Cohen, S. & Knight, R.T. (1998). Frontal lobe 
contributions to theory of mind. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 640-656. 
Stone, V.E., Baron-Cohen, S. & Knight, R.T. (1998). Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 640-656. 
Stuss, D. T. (2011). Traumatic brain injury: relation to executive dysfunction and the frontal lobes. 
Current Opinion in Neurology, 24(6), 584-589. 
Tversky, B., & Hard, B. M. (2009). Embodied and disembodied cognition: Spatial perspective-taking. 
Cognition, 110(1), 124-129. 
Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. Harcourt Assessment, Inc., San 
Antonia, TX.  
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN TBI   25 
 
Wiech, K., Kahane, G., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2013). Cold or calculating? 
Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming 
in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. Cognition, 126(3), 364-372. 
Zigmond, A. S., & Snaith, R. P. (1983). The hospital anxiety and depression scale. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 67(6), 361-370.  
Moral dilemma illustrations









Original dilemmas
Total intuitive 
responses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A troublesome property N y N N N Y N N Y 0.6667
Footbridge N N N N N N N N N 1.0000
Lie 1 N y Y Y N Y N N N 0.5556
mod. Preventing the disease Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N 0.6667
lie 3 N Y N Y N N N Y N 0.6667
autonomy 2 Y N N N Y N N Y N 0.6667
lie 5 N Y N N N N N N N 0.8889
vitamins N Y N N N N N N N 0.8889
enzymes N Y N N N N N N Y 0.7778
transplant N N N N N N N N N 1.0000
Adapted dilemmas (with illustrations)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A troublesome property N Y N N Y N N N N 0.7778
Footbridge Y Y N N N N N N N 0.7778
Lie 1 N N N N Y N N Y Y 0.6667
mod. Preventing the disease Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y 0.6667
lie 3 Y Y N Y N N N N N 0.6667
autonomy 2 Y N Y N N N Y N N 0.6667
lie 5 N N N N N Y N Y N 0.7778
vitamins N Y N N N N N N N 0.8889
enzymes N Y N N N N N N N 0.8889
transplant N N N N N N N N N 1.0000
Suplementary data - moral dilemmas pilot
